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In 1966, Alan Greenspan wrote the following
essay/article about the relationship between Gold & Economic Freedom....
which was published in Ayn Rand's "Objectivist" newsletter in 1966, and
reprinted in her book, Capitalism: The Unknown Ideal, in 1967....
By Alan Greenspan; An almost hysterical antagonism toward the gold standard
is one issue which unites statists of all persuasions. They seem to sense
- perhaps more clearly and subtly than many consistent defenders of
laissez-faire - that gold and economic freedom are inseparable, that the
gold standard is an instrument of laissez-faire and that each implies and
requires the other.
In order to understand the source of their antagonism, it is necessary
first to understand the specific role of gold in a free society.
Money is the common denominator of all economic transactions. It is that
commodity which serves as a medium of exchange, is universally acceptable
to all participants in an exchange economy as payment for their goods or
services, and can, therefore, be used as a standard of market value and as
a store of value, i.e., as a means of saving.
The existence of such a commodity is a precondition of a division of labor
economy. If men did not have some commodity of objective value which was
generally acceptable as money, they would have to resort to primitive
barter or be forced to live on self-sufficient farms and forgo the
inestimable advantages of specialization. If men had no means to store
value, i.e., to save, neither long-range planning nor exchange would be
possible.
What medium of exchange will be acceptable to all participants in an
economy is not determined arbitrarily. First, the medium of exchange
should be durable. In a primitive society of meager wealth, wheat might be
sufficiently durable to serve as a medium, since all exchanges would occur
only during and immediately after the harvest, leaving no value-surplus to
store. But where store-of-value considerations are important, as they are
in richer, more civilized societies, the medium of exchange must be a
durable commodity, usually a metal. A metal is generally chosen because it
is homogeneous and divisible: every unit is the same as every other and it
can be blended or formed in any quantity. Precious jewels, for example,
are neither homogeneous nor divisible. More important, the commodity
chosen as a medium must be a luxury. Human desires for luxuries are
unlimited and, therefore, luxury goods are always in demand and will
always be acceptable. Wheat is a luxury in underfed civilizations, but not
in a prosperous society. Cigarettes ordinarily would not serve as money,
but they did in post-World War II Europe where they were considered a
luxury. The term "luxury good" implies scarcity and high unit value.
Having a high unit value, such a good is easily portable; for instance, an
ounce of gold is worth a half-ton of pig iron.
In the early stages of a developing money economy, several media of
exchange might be used, since a wide variety of commodities would fulfill
the foregoing conditions. However, one of the commodities will gradually
displace all others, by being more widely acceptable. Preferences on what
to hold as a store of value, will shift to the most widely acceptable
commodity, which, in turn, will make it still more acceptable. The shift
is progressive until that commodity becomes the sole medium of exchange.
The use of a single medium is highly advantageous for the same reasons
that a money economy is superior to a barter economy: it makes exchanges
possible on an incalculably wider scale.
Whether the single medium is gold, silver, seashells, cattle, or tobacco
is optional, depending on the context and development of a given economy.
In fact, all have been employed, at various times, as media of exchange.
Even in the present century, two major commodities, gold and silver, have
been used as international media of exchange, with gold becoming the
predominant one. Gold, having both artistic and functional uses and being
relatively scarce, has significant advantages over all other media of
exchange. Since the beginning of World War I, it has been virtually the
sole international standard of exchange. If all goods and services were to
be paid for in gold, large payments would be difficult to execute and this
would tend to limit the extent of a society's divisions of labor and
specialization. Thus a logical extension of the creation of a medium of
exchange is the development of a banking system and credit instruments
(bank notes and deposits) which act as a substitute for, but are
convertible into, gold.
A free banking system based on gold is able to extend credit and thus to
create bank notes (currency) and deposits, according to the production
requirements of the economy. Individual owners of gold are induced, by
payments of interest, to deposit their gold in a bank (against which they
can draw checks). But since it is rarely the case that all depositors want
to withdraw all their gold at the same time, the banker need keep only a
fraction of his total deposits in gold as reserves. This enables the
banker to loan out more than the amount of his gold deposits (which means
that he holds claims to gold rather than gold as security of his
deposits). But the amount of loans which he can afford to make is not
arbitrary: he has to gauge it in relation to his reserves and to the
status of his investments.
When banks loan money to finance productive and profitable endeavors, the
loans are paid off rapidly and bank credit continues to be generally
available. But when the business ventures financed by bank credit are less
profitable and slow to pay off, bankers soon find that their loans
outstanding are excessive relative to their gold reserves, and they begin
to curtail new lending, usually by charging higher interest rates. This
tends to restrict the financing of new ventures and requires the existing
borrowers to improve their profitability before they can obtain credit for
further expansion. Thus, under the gold standard, a free banking system
stands as the protector of an economy's stability and balanced growth.
When gold is accepted as the medium of exchange by most or all nations, an
unhampered free international gold standard serves to foster a world-wide
division of labor and the broadest international trade. Even though the
units of exchange (the dollar, the pound, the franc, etc.) differ from
country to country, when all are defined in terms of gold the economies of
the different countries act as one-so long as there are no restraints on
trade or on the movement of capital. Credit, interest rates, and prices
tend to follow similar patterns in all countries. For example, if banks in
one country extend credit too liberally, interest rates in that country
will tend to fall, inducing depositors to shift their gold to
higher-interest paying banks in other countries. This will immediately
cause a shortage of bank reserves in the "easy money" country, inducing
tighter credit standards and a return to competitively higher interest
rates again.
A fully free banking system and fully consistent gold standard have not as
yet been achieved. But prior to World War I, the banking system in the
United States (and in most of the world) was based on gold and even though
governments intervened occasionally, banking was more free than
controlled. Periodically, as a result of overly rapid credit expansion,
banks became loaned up to the limit of their gold reserves, interest rates
rose sharply, new credit was cut off, and the economy went into a sharp,
but short-lived recession. (Compared with the depressions of 1920 and
1932, the pre-World War I business declines were mild indeed.) It was
limited gold reserves that stopped the unbalanced expansions of business
activity, before they could develop into the post-World Was I type of
disaster. The readjustment periods were short and the economies quickly
reestablished a sound basis to resume expansion.
But the process of cure was misdiagnosed as the disease: if shortage of
bank reserves was causing a business decline-argued economic
interventionists-why not find a way of supplying increased reserves to the
banks so they never need be short! If banks can continue to loan money
indefinitely-it was claimed-there need never be any slumps in business.
And so the Federal Reserve System was organized in 1913. It consisted of
twelve regional Federal Reserve banks nominally owned by private bankers,
but in fact government sponsored, controlled, and supported. Credit
extended by these banks is in practice (though not legally) backed by the
taxing power of the federal government. Technically, we remained on the
gold standard; individuals were still free to own gold, and gold continued
to be used as bank reserves. But now, in addition to gold, credit extended
by the Federal Reserve banks ("paper reserves") could serve as legal
tender to pay depositors.
When business in the United States underwent a mild contraction in 1927,
the Federal Reserve created more paper reserves in the hope of
forestalling any possible bank reserve shortage. More disastrous, however,
was the Federal Reserve's attempt to assist Great Britain who had been
losing gold to us because the Bank of England refused to allow interest
rates to rise when market forces dictated (it was politically
unpalatable). The reasoning of the authorities involved was as follows: if
the Federal Reserve pumped excessive paper reserves into American banks,
interest rates in the United States would fall to a level comparable with
those in Great Britain; this would act to stop Britain's gold loss and
avoid the political embarrassment of having to raise interest rates. The
"Fed" succeeded; it stopped the gold loss, but it nearly destroyed the
economies of the world, in the process. The excess credit which the Fed
pumped into the economy spilled over into the stock market-triggering a
fantastic speculative boom. Belatedly, Federal Reserve officials attempted
to sop up the excess reserves and finally succeeded in braking the boom.
But it was too late: by 1929 the speculative imbalances had become so
overwhelming that the attempt precipitated a sharp retrenching and a
consequent demoralizing of business confidence. As a result, the American
economy collapsed. Great Britain fared even worse, and rather than absorb
the full consequences of her previous folly, she abandoned the gold
standard completely in 1931, tearing asunder what remained of the fabric
of confidence and inducing a world-wide series of bank failures. The world
economies plunged into the Great Depression of the 1930's.
With a logic reminiscent of a generation earlier, statists argued that the
gold standard was largely to blame for the credit debacle which led to the
Great Depression. If the gold standard had not existed, they argued,
Britain's abandonment of gold payments in 1931 would not have caused the
failure of banks all over the world. (The irony was that since 1913, we
had been, not on a gold standard, but on what may be termed "a mixed gold
standard"; yet it is gold that took the blame.) But the opposition to the
gold standard in any form-from a growing number of welfare-state
advocates-was prompted by a much subtler insight: the realization that the
gold standard is incompatible with chronic deficit spending (the hallmark
of the welfare state). Stripped of its academic jargon, the welfare state
is nothing more than a mechanism by which governments confiscate the
wealth of the productive members of a society to support a wide variety of
welfare schemes. A substantial part of the confiscation is effected by
taxation. But the welfare statists were quick to recognize that if they
wished to retain political power, the amount of taxation had to be limited
and they had to resort to programs of massive deficit spending, i.e., they
had to borrow money, by issuing government bonds, to finance welfare
expenditures on a large scale.
Under a gold standard, the amount of credit that an economy can support is
determined by the economy's tangible assets, since every credit instrument
is ultimately a claim on some tangible asset. But government bonds are not
backed by tangible wealth, only by the government's promise to pay out of
future tax revenues, and cannot easily be absorbed by the financial
markets. A large volume of new government bonds can be sold to the public
only at progressively higher interest rates. Thus, government deficit
spending under a gold standard is severely limited. The abandonment of the
gold standard made it possible for the welfare statists to use the banking
system as a means to an unlimited expansion of credit. They have created
paper reserves in the form of government bonds which-through a complex
series of steps-the banks accept in place of tangible assets and treat as
if they were an actual deposit, i.e., as the equivalent of what was
formerly a deposit of gold. The holder of a government bond or of a bank
deposit created by paper reserves believes that he has a valid claim on a
real asset. But the fact is that there are now more claims outstanding
than real assets. The law of supply and demand is not to be conned. As the
supply of money (of claims) increases relative to the supply of tangible
assets in the economy, prices must eventually rise. Thus the earnings
saved by the productive members of the society lose value in terms of
goods. When the economy's books are finally balanced, one finds that this
loss in value represents the goods purchased by the government for welfare
or other purposes with the money proceeds of the government bonds financed
by bank credit expansion.
In the absence of the gold standard, there is no way to protect savings
from confiscation through inflation. There is no safe store of value. If
there were, the government would have to make its holding illegal, as was
done in the case of gold. If everyone decided, for example, to convert all
his bank deposits to silver or copper or any other good, and thereafter
declined to accept checks as payment for goods, bank deposits would lose
their purchasing power and government-created bank credit would be
worthless as a claim on goods. The financial policy of the welfare state
requires that there be no way for the owners of wealth to protect
themselves.
This is the shabby secret of the welfare statists' tirades against gold.
Deficit spending is simply a scheme for the confiscation of wealth. Gold
stands in the way of this insidious process. It stands as a protector of
property rights. If one grasps this, one has no difficulty in
understanding the statists' antagonism toward the gold standard.
Alan Greenspan - 1966
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